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The utopian function of film music 
Johan Siebers 
Film collects the elements of the real in order to show 
another reality with them; the dimensions of space and 
time which are fixed in the theatre are completely 
changed in film. (Pudovkin, quoted in Bloch 1986:  411) 
 
Ernst Bloch, the utopian Marxist thinker born in 1885, before cinema existed, wrote, on and 
off, about film from the early years of the 20
th
 century until the end of his life in 1977. He 
was concerned with the meaning of film as a new medium, its capacity for social 
transformation and critique, its status as an art form and its role in the process of 
modernisation of society. As a Marxist, Bloch was critical of a cinema which was already by 
his time becoming a commercial vehicle, but arguably it is his ability to see the revolutionary 
and utopian potential of film that is most important and that can offer us insights regarding 
the nature of film that are relevant today. Supportive of Lenin’s statement that film was the 
most important form of contemporary art because it could reach the people and directly 
engage with their consciousness, Bloch added, implicitly, an aesthetical understanding of 
cinema which emphasised the way in which cinema can take apart the integrated experience 
of reality and distort, fragment or transform it by virtue of its technical affordances – 
zooming in and out, panning, slow motion and fast forward, but also the use of music, which 
I will explore in this chapter. We know these ideas also from Benjamin’s remarks on film as 
the art form commensurate to a fragmented, shattered modernity. But for Bloch they are part 
of a utopian aesthetic of cinema; the parameters of montage are different for Bloch than they 
are for Benjamin. 
Montage for Benjamin expresses a shattered history in which the light of redemption 
reflects, as it were, between the shards of history. What Benjamin called the dialectical image 
is the estranged experience of the fact that there is history in the confrontation of realities 
belonging to different times, as when we find back an old object in a cupboard for which we 
no longer have any use. In those, essentially passive, apprehensive, moments we experience 
that there is time, and a time that is not moving towards an all-encompassing totality. The 
redemptive totality is, as it were, equally far removed from each point in time. That, in my 
view itself still, or again, theological interpretation of history, is reflected in Benjamin’s 
understanding of montage. For Bloch montage also expresses modernity that had become a 
‘Hohlraum mit Funken’, a cavity with sparks as opposed to a world filled with the presence 
of the divine (Bloch 1998). But the relation of the sparks to the redemptive totality is a 
different one. The old object has an unredeemed future within it, for Bloch. Understanding 
Blochian montage will give us a better appreciation of the potential of Bloch’s philosophy for 
film theory today.  For Bloch, film critique can be seen to consist primarily in elucidating 
what he calls the Not-Yet-Conscious in this cultural form: how the medium channels and 
articulates human hopes, aspirations, longings and desires, how the fragmented world in 
which we live is not only the shattered ruin of a false, ideological, sense of unity and purpose, 
but the possibility for a truer relation to unity and identity as yet to come, as a self-realising, 
precarious but not yet thwarted possibility. A world without a recognition, schooling and 
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critique of the human potential for hope is a ‘world without why’ as Raymond Geuss once 
called it. The commoditisation of desire and the disappearance (or re-theologisation) of the 
big questions regarding the meaning of human existence go hand in hand and have dominated 
cultural theory for decades. Now that the climate is changing, looking again at Bloch, who 
had no doubts about the importance of asking the big questions of life, and did so from within 
historical materialism, can help us in the task of putting cultural theory once again in a 
position in which it can provide a critical voice and active resistance with respect to the 
nihilism of contemporary culture. This is not just an academic undertaking. It reflects and can 
reinforce the attempts to formulate positive alternatives to the socio-political realities created 
by neoliberalism, the increasing gap between rich and poor, the privatisation of all aspects of 
life, the lack of felt significance in the lives of many people, the exploitation of the social and 
natural environment, the still continuing totalisation of the subservience of the state to the 
economy, the withering away of freedom: we are experiencing more than before the 
devastation of the human and natural life-world that has been brought about and are more and 
more losing faith in the ability of existing systems to correct themselves.  
With Bloch’s philosophy we can see that these realities have something to do with the 
absence of a vision, or if you prefer, a discourse, of the ultimate questions of human life: 
‘Who are we? Where do we come from? Where are we going? What are we waiting for? 
What awaits us?’ (Bloch 1986: 3) Asking these questions, which means exposing ourselves to 
them, makes us human because it is the recognition of the fact that we are not known to 
ourselves, we are, in essence, incognito and therefore we create above ourselves, go out of 
ourselves, are underway. This is a central idea for critical theory, expressed by Adorno 
several years later: ‘(N)othing can be even experienced as living if it does not contain a 
promise of something transcending life. This transcendence therefore is, and at the same time 
is not – and beyond that contradiction it is no doubt very difficult, and probably impossible, 
for thought to go’ (Adorno 2001: 145). It has been one of the motivations of western 
Marxism (at least up to Habermas) to insist on this need for transcendence; the analysis of the 
commoditisation or functionalisation of the life world and of reason acquires its significance 
in the light of this underlying idea. Adorno, in his aesthetics, sought not to go beyond the 
contradiction. He thought no more could be done than to perpetually seek reminders of it, 
reminders that ‘there can be no true life in falseness’. Bloch does try to go beyond it. For him, 
the ontology of not-yet-being is the vehicle with which to move beyond the joint ‘is’ and ‘is 
not’ of the promise that animates all life, the vehicle with which to perceive that promise for 
what it is and what it asks of us in the first place. We must be careful not to misread Bloch on 
this point.  
His marginal position owes much to the subtlety of his thought: it is easily mistaken 
as an attempt to put religion into historical materialism and Marxism, or vice versa. It has 
indeed been taken as such by Marxists, for whom Bloch often retained the atmosphere of 
bourgeois thought, but also for the theologians, for whom Bloch mostly seemed too much of 
a materialist. The ontology of the not-yet, however, gives us the means by which to 
understand what the religious interpretation of the transcendence of life really amounts to, 
just as it gives us the means by which to understand why mechanical, positivist materialism is 
itself an ideological formation and not a philosophical position. Both the religious and the 
positivist stance reify the transcending function of life into a transcendent realm, pre-given 
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destiny or pre-given normativity, which one then affirms, the other denies. Both lead to a 
worldview that ignores the constant movement beyond itself in which all that exists is 
enveloped, both, from Adorno’s point of view as we just introduced it, miss what gives life 
meaning: process as the immament movement of life. With that we have reached the 
standpoint of cinema, or at least of a certain form of cinema. 
 
Bloch’s philosophy has been applied to film as a cultural phenomenon by Douglas Kellner 
and Frederic Jameson, but has not found any widespread application so far (Kellner 1997, 
Jameson 2007). Kellner and Jameson have, above all, referred to Bloch’s understanding of 
ideology.
1
 For Bloch ideology is effective because it has a utopian core. Ideological 
formations are forms of false consciousness, but they arise around a core human desire or 
truth from which they draw much of their life force. In what may appear to us as an irrational 
dialectic, the distortion of the utopian core does not diminish the efficacy of the ideology – on 
the contrary, the falseness of the ideology seems to always be known, in some sense, by those 
who subscribe to it – and yet they act in accordance with the ideology. This point has also 
been made by Žižek (Žižek 1989, 2009): an ideology works precisely because it distorts that 
from which it lives, because those who are under the sway of it do not really believe it. For, 
as Žižek argues in many places, someone who were to fully subscribe, let us say to limitless 
capitalism as the colonisation of all use value by exchange value, would soon lose all will to 
do anything at all. For Žižek it is only because the ideology of value is not accepted fully as 
belief – some value remains irreducible to exchange value - that the rule of exchange value 
can become total.  
This negative belief that makes ideology possible shoves itself in between the 
‘official’ ideological rationalisation and the – always ineffable – utopian core of human 
existence, the incognito that is in process of becoming. Thus ideology is a double 
colonisation: it encapsulates the potentially shattering, and at any rate, uncanny, experience 
of the incognito of existence in the form of a rationalising ideological neutralisation of it, 
which is then reinforced, paradoxically, by negating it, so by giving the subject a sense of a 
certain distance towards it. But the utopian core, the incognito, has become doubly invisible: 
first it is neutralised by rationalisation, then the rationalisation, by refusing its totalisation, 
strengthens its hold. If ideology would insist on being accepted as complete truth, it would 
quickly show its irrationality and would lose its grip on us. The ideological neutralisation is 
effective precisely because it is not fully believed, and so the experience of the incognito 
remains effective as well, but it is co-opted because it now only functions to sustain the 
ideology. Ideology is utopia’s vampire. The operation of ideology distorts the incognito 
twice: first ideology neutralises it, secondly ideology can do this because it still takes its 
energy from the negative of the incognito. To our conscious lives, the result is an attitude of 
congratulating ourselves with the fact that we do not fully believe what we are told to believe 
or what we in fact, or better: in our actions, manifest as subscribing to. The good sense of 
reserving judgement is mobilised for the totalising rule of ideology as the enjoyment we get 
                                                          
1
 In this essay I will use the term ideology as referring to dominant forms of normative and naturalised false 
consciousness, not in the more descriptive sense of any belief system not based on the nature of the material 
means of production and shared by a group, which serves to create and reproduce social structure and cohesion. 
See Geuss 1981, 9-13.) 
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from being allowed to transgress the ideological framework to which we yet subscribe. “I 
know all is said to be, and made to be, exchange value, but I also know that that is not really 
true, so I can go ahead and, with approval of the economic system, enjoy this particular 
product as being there just for myself” – and in this way I reinforce and help the totalisation 
of the rule of exchange value. This is the perversion inherent in all ideological formations, all 
forms of ‘law’ (in the Lacanian sense of law that Žižek uses) or patriarchy. The law says ‘you 
shall not’, but looks away knowingly as you transgress it, as long as you do so in its name 
and this experience is the experience of enjoyment. The small favour ideology extends to its 
subjects keeps them in its grip (hence Žižek can say that ideology today, in fact, orders us to 
‘enjoy!’; Žižek 2002). The outcome of this situation is that the critique of ideology can only 
be effective if it brings out the utopian core in the way the subject relates to ideology, and 
rescues that core from its perversion: false consciousness remains mostly unaffected, and is 
sometimes even strengthened, by its mere unmasking as such without something else, namely 
an experimental relation to its opposite, being put into action in the same gesture. At this 
point, we need to move beyond Žižek’s perceptive analysis, and for that purpose we have to 
turn to Bloch. The critique of ideology requires a positive alternative, a creative and 
experimental relation to the incognito of existence. Bloch sometimes expresses this by saying 
that a utopia that remains abstract is itself ideological; a real utopia exists only as a concrete 
utopia.  
In Žižek’s thought, the incognito of existence is conceptualised as the Lacanian 
subject, which is always a lack. It cannot be encountered, formulated or be held in view 
unambiguously, but only as the incommensurability of different discourses and practices that 
all circle around it as a vanishing point – culture, politics, economics, psychoanalysis, ethics, 
love etcetera. Žižek’s name for this state of affairs is the parallax view, the skewed position 
that appears to be there when we view an object from different positions. There is a large 
overlap between the Lacanian lack and the Blochian incognito, for which much of this holds 
true, too. But there is also a difference. Žižek sees philosophy (as a cultural construct) as the 
mistaken attempt to reach closure with respect to this subjectivity, to encapsulate it in a 
systematic, ordered totality. This is for him, as we can understand, an ideological operation. It 
is the ideological operation par excellence, we might say. Theory, as opposed to philosophy, 
does not fall into this trap but, in accepting the parallax view, and hence the incompleteness 
of anyting theory can do, is able to give space to subjectivity (Žižek 2006). However, as 
Frederic Jameson has noted, while there is in theory, as opposed to philosophy, ‘no master 
code’, ‘the provisional terms in which it does its work inevitably over time (...) get reified (...) 
and eventually turn into systems in their own right (...), the anti-philosophy becomes a 
philosophy’ (Jameson 2006). 
So, precisely by treating incompleteness, the lack, as final, theory closes in on itself 
and achieves the opposite of what it sets out to do. It becomes ideology, following exactly the 
pattern of ideological colonisation that Žižek himself described so persuasively. It is only by 
keeping open the question of completeness that the practice of theory can prevent becoming 
ideological. But that means that there cannot be just a negative utopian element, the 
permanent non-place that theory circles; theory has to understand itself dialectically as 
standing in the movement towards something there is no guarantee of ever reaching. It can 
only remain true to itself if it gives up control in this ultimate dimension; stating the finality 
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of incompleteness is, as it were, its last temptation. This is what Bloch means by the 
‘principle of hope’ and the ‘spirit of utopia’, and what, later, inspired Adorno to write that the 
‘only philosophy which can be responsibly practised in face of despair is the attempt to 
contemplate all things as they would present themselves from the standpoint of redemption’ 
(Adorno 2005, 247). Philosophy, understood in this way, is a struggle with the impossible in 
the name of possibility. It is the difficult position between having and not-having that is, in 
the last instance, the incognito itself, the ‘darkness of the lived moment’ (Bloch 2000). At this 
point Bloch concludes that psychoanalysis is one-sided. There is not just the repressed 
unconscious (the ‘night dream’), but also, on the other side of consciousness as it were, the 
not-yet-conscious, where we are in touch with the utopian in desires, wishes, inspiration and 
creativity (the ‘day dream’; Bloch 1986, 86-88). For Bloch, philosophy as ideology critique 
deals with this not-yet-conscious dimension. A new language and a new conceptuality are 
necessary to express it. 
 
Bloch analysed the rise of fascism as the double-bind of ideology in his Heritage of our 
Times (1935) and we can see how Hollywood cinema is open to a similar analysis. Bloch had, 
indeed, started this analysis himself in The Principle of Hope (1959). For Hollywood cinema 
the perversely enjoyed, distorted, utopian core can be summarised as ‘happy end within a 
completely unchanged world’ (Bloch 1986: 410). The medium of film created the technical 
possibility of an artistic expression of the immediacy of what Bloch called the ‘darkness of 
the lived moment’, our subjective existence in its moving, double, claire-obscure nature of 
partial illumination and partial incognito, as at once a spatio-temporal and a narrative reality: 
‘the technique of film shows actions through quite different bodies to those of painting, 
namely through moved, not stationary bodies; so that the borders between descriptive space-
form, narrative time-form, disappear’ (Bloch 1986: 411-12). Moreover, film affords 
possibilities neither theatre nor opera, the other movement- or time-based arts, provide, which 
in the time of ‘cracking’ capitalism bring close the ironical result of showing the possibility 
of another world through the cracks exposed by the technical affordances of the 
cinematographic medium: 
 
(N)o distance, no peep-show, rather the spectator walking alongside; chamber-
music pantomime, not entirely lost even in the mass produced commodity, 
predominant in good films; opening up of the wide world, especially nearby, in the 
incidental, in pantomimic detail. In addition there is the maneuverability of detail, 
of groupings which have become fixed themselves, made possible by the 
techniques of film and so closely related to the waking dream. Now, given this so 
good, if also thwarted technical How, as far as the What of the film is concerned, 
namely the subject-materials specific to it, the period in which the development of 
film falls not only had a capitalistically devastating, but in a limited sense also - we 
may say: ironically usable effect. For as a period of bourgeois decay it is also a 
period of cracked surface, of the previous groupings and identities decaying; 
consequently it is, as in painting, so in film, the time of a not only subjectively, but 
objectively possible montage. Because this became objectively possible it is in no 
way necessarily arbitrary and completely unreal (with regard to the objective 
events); it is much rather in a position to correspond to changes in the external 
To appear in: Marx at the Movies (Lars Kristensen and Ewa Mazierska (eds.), Palgrave 2014) 
6 
 
relation of appearance and essence itself. Here is the field of new hints and genuine 
authorities, the field of discovered-real separations between objects which 
previously appeared to be closely adjoining, of discovered-real attachment between 
apparently very remote ones in the bourgeois order of relations; good films 
correspondingly made constant use of such maneuverability which has become 
realistically possible even in terms of subject-materials. (Bloch 1986, 410-11) 
 
Precisely because of its technical possibilities, even commercial film comes to tell the tale, à 
contre coeur, on the fragmenting world in which we live, exposing the nakedness of even the 
happy end without changing the world. As an example of the spatiotemporal montage Bloch 
speaks about, we could think of the scene in City Lights in which the tramp, on the run from 
the police, jumps into the car of the millionaire on one side, to step out of it on the other. That 
montage of rich and poor, which would be unconvincing if staged in a theatre or opera 
because it requires a hint at a rupture of the unity of action, time and place, sets off the action 
in which the blind girl mistakes the tramp for a millionaire. The tramp’s jump through the car 
is the leap of the imagination which founds the theme of the film. Then the dialectic of rich 
and poor can unfold, the open question of the possibility of a happy end in an unchanged 
world of tramps and millionaires can be prepared, and the moment of recognition, which 
remains also a moment of incognito, can occur. 
 
Chaplin’s tramp is a fairy tale figure. Fairy tales have a utopian form because they typically 
express wishes and dreams in a magical way and the narratives develop by actions of 
‘ordinary’ people without power who, by cleverness, perseverance and a dose of luck succeed 
in dethroning power. Bloch contrasts the fairy tale to the myth and the saga which, in 
contrast, serve to preserve power relations and dominant ideologies: 
 
To speak in a modern way, most fairy tales have something Chaplinesque 
about them. They are not ‘mini-myths’ as the reactionary interpretation 
would have it; nor are they crudely disenchanted myths. The fairy tale is a 
genre that has tried to avoid falling into the feudalism of the saga and the 
despotism of the myth, and has managed to save the mythical element in a 
different form - a form which suits its own proper spirit. (Bloch 2009: 25; 
translation amended.) 
 
In a short essay from 1932, Significant Change in Cinematic Fables (Bloch 1998: 59-62), 
Bloch writes about the changes film makes to traditional narratives. He emphasises that 
motifs of failure, of passing-by, of missing each other are often foregrounded in movie 
adaptations of traditional tales and fairy tales. He sees in this a feature of modernity. In this 
context he again mentions Chaplin, in a remark that addresses the incognito in film directly: 
 
(T)he gentle tale of missed opportunity, resurfacing on occasion in the work 
of Chaplin, (...) offers an insight into the nature of things. Into the nature of 
time, where the old vanishes away while the new has not yet become clearly 
evident; and where that which is best is not a tale, but is likewise traveling, 
passing us by, unrecognised. (Bloch 1998: 62) 
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Art, for Bloch, expresses what is yet to come. It creates premonitions, pre-figurations, pre-
appearances of what might be; art has a utopian core. This view of the function of the work of 
art has its roots in Schopenhauer’s aesthetics and its distinction between will and 
representation, but Bloch turns Schopenhauer’s philosophy inside-out. In art we come to 
know and come to be part of the creative process that is reality itself; Bloch sees the artist as 
the avant-gardist who lives at the front of realisation. Of all art forms, music is for Bloch the 
most utopian one. It comes closest to expressing the deepest strivings and hopes, the tendency 
that is latent in being, just as, for Schopenhauer, music was the art form which most directly 
makes the life-will itself accessible to experience. For Bloch the reasons for the special place 
of music have to do, on one hand, with the pre-semantic nature of music, on the other it is 
because of the fact that music is a temporalising, moving art form. This makes the relation 
between cinema and music particularly interesting. Indeed, some of Bloch’s earliest writings 
(from 1913) on film deal with the question of music in film. In the silent movie, Bloch 
argues, the isolated visual image opens up a pantomimic space and the music, which runs like 
a tapestry underneath the moving image, has the task of compensating for all the other senses, 
establishing the connection between the image on the screen and lived reality. Music creates 
the whole sensorium within the art form, without which the moving image cannot become 
expressive. In the silent movie, the material world becomes music, and so we experience the 
utopian tone of reality itself in film. The fact that film puts all weight on the optical and 
renders the rest of the sensorium peripheral heightens this utopian potential even more, 
because the utopian, the absolute, is given to us only in the indirect experience, at the 
periphery of our field of experience and in the gaps in the field of experience, in the 
irreducible gap between foreground and background.  
The material world becoming music – that had happened before, Bloch suggests, in the 
‘musical drama’ of Wagner. In Spirit of Utopia (1918) Bloch had devoted a long section to a 
discussion of Wagner’s musicological innovations, and had stated that Wagner breaks with 
the closed form of the symphony in retrieving the ‘endless melody’ of song. In a similar way, 
Bloch argues, film music uses essentially open, often improvised, compositional (melodic 
and rhythmic) patterns. Like the Wagnerian motif, film music uses scores that can easily be 
recognised and that allow for easy variation. Thus a contrast emerges between the open, 
improvised form of music in film, and the closed form of music in symphony and opera 
before Wagner. It will be clear that this way of approaching the role of music, not just in film, 
but also in opera, sets us off on quite a different footing than the perspective Adorno 
elaborates from the viewpoint that the Wagnerian Leitmotif prefigures the jingle as 
commoditised form of identity or a manifestation of the repetitiveness of the death drive 
(Adorno 1952). Yet, one does not exclude the other – just as the technique of film can be 
corrupted, but even within its corruption give a voice to the ‘not-yet’. 
In his earliest texts on music in silent cinema (Bloch 1998, 156-162) it is precisely the fact 
that film is ‘silent’ that makes it a truly utopian art form. Not just subjective emotion, but the 
whole of reality becomes music, is expressed from its musical, read utopian, core as a longing 
and a hope for an identity between subject and object, the human and the world; a longing for 
the world at home. Music points in the direction of what is not yet in this ultimate sense. The 
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particular mediality that results from the combination of music and the silent movie gives 
cinema, this type of cinema, an unchartered potential for expressing the immanent 
utopianism, the hope that is central to Bloch’s understanding of Marxism. As an avant-garde 
medium, film becomes itself an instance of the front of realisation. Between the silent image 
and the sounding music a pre-appearance can open up, fleeting and ungraspable, of a utopian 
world. Not a utopian world with a specific form, not a programmatic utopia, but as the 
symbolic intention that captures an always identical if inexpressible expectation: this is what 
it would have to sound like and look like. I am not thinking here only of a lyrical moment in 
the silent movie, but about the gap that opens up between the possibilities intimated by 
music, even by a comical fanfare, certainly by a swing beat or blues, and the pantomimic act 
on the screen, whether it is comical or tragic, epical or lyrical. Utopian sensibility lives in the 
gaze askance or awry. The utopian is encountered in the gap between image and sound, or in 
the fragment, in the surplus, in that which escapes order.  
In Marxist terms we could say that this gap is a factor of the ‘use value’ of art that is resistant 
to being reduced to exchange value. It is, as Bloch insists throughout his writing, encountered 
in a movement of transgression. In the silent movie, Chaplin’s figure of the tramp, which 
stands for the one who is ‘too much in any situation’, the one who ‘should not be there’ 
(Žižek and Fiennes 2006), is such a transgressive, and hence latently utopian image. Chaplin 
uses this figure to mutely point to a goal that can only be raised into consciousness 
negatively, via the act of failure, slapstick, and its concomitant affect, laughter: something 
was attempted, against the odds, and it fails. In this way the missing something becomes 
conscious. Positively speaking, as Žižek formulates the position of the tramp, the subject 
desires recognition, but for the situation where recognition could occur, he is always too 
much, ‘an obscene and excessive surplus’ (Žižek, Fiennes 2006). In his analysis of the ending 
of Chaplin’s City Lights, Žižek points out that the moment of recognition between the tramp 
and the girl, the moment the girl realises the person who helped her to cure her blindness, is 
the moment where false love, treating the loved person as having to conform to your own 
ideal, can turn into true love, which is a recognition of the real other: ‘here I am as what I 
really am’. But the happy end is not guaranteed. The music, Žižek says, goes on while the 
screen fades to black, the words ‘The End’ appear, and disappear again, leaving only the 
imageless movement of the music behind. What has opened up is too strong for anything but 
music, the music (Žižek says ‘singing’, although the score is entirely instrumental) exceeds 
the frame.  
This moment of recognition is a classical example of anagnorisis, the plot-turning moment in 
which the true nature of the situation is recognised – one of the most centrally utopian 
moments to which Bloch returns time and again. Oedipus, Joseph, Saul’s experience on the 
road to Damascus – these are all examples where the truth comes to light and creates a 
transgression, as much as the awareness of a previous transgression: a retroactive light 
thrown upon a crime. In City Lights the psychological complexity of erotic desire, as Plato 
says the son of poverty and riches, is personified in the tramp who becomes a millionaire in 
the eyes of the blind girl. He suffers for it, and we are left to wonder what his own blindness 
was or if the girl will be blinded once again by the truth that she discovers at the end. Žižek 
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reads the tramp’s poverty as his nakedness, that for which he must be ashamed, once his love 
can see who he really is, while at the same time the only thing he wants is to be seen for who 
he is. We can contrast Žižek’s psychoanalytical reading with a Blochian one, which is not so 
much in contradiction with it, but which emphasises another aspect, the one that is implied in 
the music which goes on and which puts the whole world in the light of the love between the 
two protagonists, without identifying what that love is, can or will be. It is as if the film 
follows the prohibition, or better the impossibility, of making an image of what happens 
when we ‘behold face to face’, when the darkness at the heart of subjectivity is illuminated 
by adequate objectivity. This limit-moment of recognition comes after the thunder of 
anagnorisis has died away. We can, as yet, only be taken there by a return to a form of 
darkness, to a mere, but nevertheless real, pre-appearance of identity. That is why the screen 
goes black and the music remains. The music pulls us along as it migrates into the other 
world – ‘der schwingende Ton zieht fort’. “The vibration of sound fades away” is the 
translation used in the English edition of Literary Essays (Bloch 1998: 290) It fails to capture 
the deliberate ambiguity of ‘fortziehen’: to move away, to disappear, but also to migrate, to 
go elsewhere, or even, transitively, to pull something away or along: the vibrating tone also 
pulls us away, goads us on towards the new, to what was not yet. 
But let us be clear: film persists predominantly as a site of reproduction of ideology. Why? Is 
all that is left for film criticism ideology critique? Is there anything more utopian to be 
discerned? Can we discern a utopian, subversive ‘not-yet’ in film today by which this 
medium can escape its function of enacting the double colonisation of ideology? Can film 
music still be ’the swinging tone that pulls us away and along’? Is the temporal nature of the 
medium still able to embody the exodus of utopian, transgressive thinking, feeling and acting, 
or has the time of cinema become the time of the succession of now-moments, unrelated or 
only related in an a-historical messianic longing for redemption that is equally strong, or 
weak, at each moment? Film has to seek the limits of narrativity and, because of the 
fragmenting and re-combining nature of the medium, it has always done that. But how are 
exodus and narrativity related, how can one become the salvaging of the other, giving hope 
back to film, and vice versa? Can that connection be a credible principle for a 
cinematographic aesthetic? Such are the challenges a Marxist film aesthetic faces today. 
Kellner and Jameson both used Bloch’s utopian analysis of ideology to show up the utopian 
elements in Hollywood cinema (e.g. in Jaws (1975), as it were despite the ideology. With a 
more accurate understanding of Bloch, we can now say that at the heart of the ideological 
formation lies a utopian motivation, which is expressed and distorted, often beyond 
recognition, by its ideological articulation. Moments where film is not (just) the articulation 
of ideology, but becomes aware of the utopian silent core in all expression as the source and 
goal of artistic expression, as well as of the necessity to use forms that are liable to 
ideological distortion to bring the utopian into the world, are not plentiful. But they are there 
and they resist all forms of sentimental reading. A Blochian-Marxist film criticism would 
look for the point at which all films are yet silent movies, manifestations of the not-yet 
conscious and even the not-yet-real. 
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Wagnerian reprisals abound: the shark theme in Jaws, Darth Vader’s motif, the unbearable 
tremolos and violins in blockbuster cinema (Titanic (1997), Lord of the Rings (2001-2003). 
Iconic moments in which film music, also in spoken film, is utopian, not-yet, exodus can be 
seen in the opening sequence of Once upon a Time in the West (1968), where the music 
enters the action of the film and in the same vein the sounds of the image, the beating of the 
locomotive engine, the whistle and the rhythm of the train on the tracks, become musical. We 
can see utopia also in the theme, now comical, of The Pink Panther (1963), which crosses out 
the Wagnerian Leitmotif in the self-ironisation of the expectation-laden melody. The self-
assured crescendo of the theme builds up an anticipation which is subverted, almost in  
slapstick fashion, by the sudden decrescendo. This is the comical element. But it opens up 
onto a surplus in the theme, the lightly syncopic, rhythmically fading coda of swing that, 
much in Bloch’s sense, is the swinging tone that moves on and that pulls us along with it, into 
an open possibility, having overcoming the earlier lapse. The panther, like the tramp, is a 
fairy tale figure.   
Far from being usurped by the logic of capital, the exodus motif still abounds in film. In its 
commoditised, less commoditised and authentic forms, film is the art form of exodus. At all 
levels of its materialisation it is a transformative and transforming medium: technology, 
reception, the way it has transformed the art world itself and other art forms such as painting, 
theatre and literature (the novel), the development of narrative, the change to the sensorium 
itself such that we now live in an image culture, but also one in which music, equally double-
faced, is ubiquitous and endless. As Lars von Trier showed in Melancholia, frankly in a 
reactionary fashion (in other words from a depressive position): we will go down to the sound 
of Wagner’s strings and their endless melody – a metonym of music’s ubiquitous presence in 
contemporary culture. Here, the preciousness of life can only be experienced under the threat 
of its imminent and total negation. This is the situation Adorno called the administered world 
(Die verwaltete Welt, Adorno 1970), and it is what Žižek means by ideology (Žižek and 
Fiennes 2013). 
The utopian, whether in music or in other aspects of film, remains, and this is the great 
advance brought by Bloch’s philosophy, a matter of the askance and awry, of what does not 
fit and transgresses, what transports us. No direct, literal utopian aesthetic can be anything 
but inadequate. The fragmentation, isolation, micrological gaze that film has allowed with 
respect to our sensory consciousness has opened up the possibility of a creative culture after 
the death of God, after the deconstruction of the grand narrative – a process already in full 
swing when Bloch started to write about film. But – and this is important – the montage that 
becomes possible now and that shows the utopian as it lights up and dies away and yet retains 
its validity, like the music in the silent movie (and, the same thing, the dialectical image in 
Benjamin’s work), is no less committed to an idea of the necessary, universal nature of that 
which cannot be expressed in any single way but always needs juxtaposition and movement 
from one to another to appear: the promise of fulfilment. Film still has the capacity to give a 
form to this promise of something transcending life, and is exposed to doing just that all the 
time, even if only in the commoditised expectations of the movie-going audience, as in 
Woody Allen’s The Purple Rose of Cairo (1985) where these expectations unsettle the 
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medium, and its place in transforming life, itself. In the montage of music’s transformative 
efficacy and narratives of personal or collective liberation, the utopian, the no-place of 
longing can shine up dramatically as being all around us – ungraspable, uncolonisable, but 
there. We can see this for example in the montage of the Ulysses motif, the exodus motif of 
the escape from Egypt and the dialectical sound-image of the American folk and rock 
tradition in O Brother Where Art Thou? (2000), or in the hopeful and yet disillusioned 
exploration of the light that ‘shines into the childhood of all and in which no one has yet 
been’ (Bloch 1986: 1376) of Bergman’s Fanny and Alexander (1982). These films are not 
only social or ideology critiques, they also activate a utopian image, a hope for a better world 
and the direction in which it may lie. 
Bloch’s no less existential than Marxist film aesthetic allows us to enrich the sometimes worn 
schematism of Marxist ideology critique, and its sighing under the image prohibition 
regarding the communist society which it inherited from its religious roots.   It allows us to 
enrich utopian consciousness with the open creativity, the montage, the fractal and moving 
imagery of the cinematographic experience; it allows us to salvage the fairy tale and make it 
meaningful for social and cultural transformation. Conversely, cinema can come to play a 
vital role in the renewal of Marxist thought itself, so that, as Bloch already wrote in the 
1940s: ‘Marxism therefore is not a non-utopia, but the genuine, concretely-mediated and 
processually open one’. We can say that cinema, correctly understood, by coordinating the 
utopian not-yet of imagination, the field of sensory perception and the ideational space, has 
the ability to open up radical futurity for us. But radical futurity is not the pure contingency of 
the absolute ability to be surprised – a notion that flips over into its opposite, the ever-
sameness of mere nextness. No, the radical futurity that cinema can teach us to see and take 
hold of, is one in which we learn to understand our night-dreams, the realm of the 
unconscious, and learn to take hold of our day-dreams, the realm of the not-yet conscious. 
Film can be, as Bloch calls it, a medium for concrete utopia. Film is often a dream factory, 
the denial of the very thing that makes the dream what it is, but it can be a critique, in the 
Benjaminian sense of a reflective consideration of the truth content of a work of art, a 
schooling and a material realisation of our capacity to dream beyond our expectations, to 
actively hope for a different world. To reclaim the radical purport and potential of the 
(day)dream work of film today is the task of a cinematographic aesthetics that takes its cues 
from Marxism. In ways that have not been made explicit up until now, Bloch’s thought can 
provide a starting point for that work. 
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